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ABSTRACT

While a critic measures a speech against a number of standards to determine its worth, a historian attempts to explain it in the context of social-institutional activity. After discussing the differences between rhetorical criticism and rhetorical history, this paper distinguishes among various types of historical explanations, illustrates each type from rhetorical literature, and offers several conclusions that emerge from these distinctions. The paper outlines the following three forms of historical explanations: (1) answering the question, "What is it?" when either no word exists to identify a series of characteristics surrounding an event or potentially more than one word or concept applies; (2) responding to "How did it come to be?" when events are puzzling or unexpected; and (3) applying "Why did it happen?" to relate events and arrive at generalizations or covering laws through induction and deduction. The paper suggests that rhetorical students should continue to examine their logical structures through the rationale and claims of history. (HAI)

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HISTORICAL EXPLANATION AND RHETORICAL ANALYSIS

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Even though most rhetorical analysts at least since the appearance of Edwin Black's Rhetorical Criticism; A Study in Method have rather more proudly worn the label "critic" than "historian," recent articles in speech communication journals indicate that there nevertheless is still a coterie of scholars interested in writing rhetorical history.[1] As a matter of record, I personally have contributed to that body of writing, urging that we more clearly distinguish "rhetorical history" from "rhetorical criticism," on the bases of the kinds of claims, tests of evidence, and notions of knowledge I see confronting historians vis-à-vis critics.[2]

Although some have questioned the distinctions I offered, today I do not want to return directly to those issues. Rather, I want to extend an argument I began in that Speech Teacher article, an argument that urges us to consider historical explanation--and hence historically gained knowledge--as a special series of intellectual claims. More specifically, I wish to offer some discriminations among various types of historical explanation and their intellectual appeals, to illustrate them briefly out of rhetorical literature, and finally to spell out a few conclusions the distinctions coerce for practicing rhetorical historians. Hence, while this paper probably belongs to that scholarship we term "philosophy of history," I hope I am addressing this analysis to practitioners rather than speculators, in

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an attempt to remind those scholars who occupy the trenches of special collections rooms in libraries what sorts of logics, ultimately, justify their attempts to explain the past and predict the future.

Types of Historical Explanations

Generally, then, we must begin with the commonplace but important assumption that any historian, regardless of subdiscipline, is seeking to explain--that is, to identify, rationalize, and/or account for--some phenomenon or group of phenomena. An historian must be distinguished from a chronicler on the one side, and, as I urged two years ago, a critic on the other. A chronicler merely records, sets the sequence straight, without providing a conceptual pattern; and, a critic goes farther than an historian, not only explaining but also making social, political, ethical, etc., judgments with the aid of value-standards or normative postures. For example, suppose the President gave a speech today. A chronicler would duly record it and surrounding details--size of audience, speech writers who supplied words and ideas, newpapers which abstracted it, critics who lambasted it, etc.--so as to help the society remember it. And, a critic probably would attempt to measure its worth against any number of standards--ethical, generic, linguistic, dramaturgical, etc. But, the historian would try to explain it, by asking (1) "What is it?", (2) "How did it come to be?", and (3) "Why did it happen?"[3] Historians, then, are scholars interested in explaining the "what," "how," and "why" of social-institutional activity. Let us examine, structurally and functionally, each of these sorts of explanations.

Explanations 'what.' The most fundamental question an historian can ask is, of course, "What is it?" The determination of "whatness" is essen-

tially a descriptive activity, wherein one applies concepts or "names," which are the "whats," to data or observations, which comprise the "it." Normally, an historian asks "What is it?" in either of two situations: either we may not have a proper word for identifying a series of characteristics of some event, or potentially more than one word or concept may seem applicable. Thus, some explanations-what are basically definitive or innovative, and take the form:

(1) "In this context, a, b, and c will count as X."

Students of John Searle will notice that this sentence has all the characteristics of a constitutive rule, and well it should, for definitive explanations-what are verbal constructs which isolate a series of characteristics of some thing or event for examination. Four years ago, I urged that the term "rhetorical timing" ought to be used to refer to the interaction of four discrete variables in a communicative situation. I certainly was not reporting ways in which other people used that phrase; rather, I was appropriating--inventing--a term which I thought our communicative vocabulary needed to describe problematic phenomena. There is, then, a certain arbitrariness to definitive explanations-what, in that their inventers are arguing that one series of characteristics of some phenomena ought to be attached to a label or name. This is not to assert as a corollary, however, that such definitions are merely verbal exercises; they are in fact explanations which bring order and comprehensibility to a series of problematic data.[4]

The second sort of explanation-what we can call classificatory or reportive explanations-what. A full-blown classificatory explanation-what takes a more complicated form:

(2) "Generally, a, b, and c count as X, while d, e, and f count as Y; a, b, and c are present; therefore, this is an X."

As this formal representation indicates, classificatory explanations-what draw their force from the attempt to fit the data to the concept and not the other day around, as was the case with definitive explanations. Thus, British students of the eighteenth century talk about the "American Rebellion," while American scholars tend to speak of the "American Revolution"; that dispute is more than verbal, really, for it indicates decisions scholars have made in rank-ordering the various situational factors which preceded Lexington and Concord. For another example, it does make a difference whether we classify the events of the 1960's as "reforms" or as "revolutions." Processes of reform and revolution, we all know, involve quite different social-political dynamics, result from differential states of psycho-social shock or tension, and normally are resolved by varied institutional responses. In other words, we get one explanation of the '60s when they are viewed as a period of reform, quite another if they are seen as revolutionary.

Historians, then, are wont to offer both definitive and classificatory explanations-what. Why? Perhaps because, at bottom, both sorts of explanations are useful to consumers of history as <u>conceptualizations.</u> They both assemble mounds of events or characteristics of situations and then either give or apply "names" to those events so as to provide consumers with <u>understandings</u>. If we assume, with the subjectivist sociologists of our age,[5] that our mental processes are nurtured and shaped by our symbol systems, by significations which are attached to those symbols, and by the society which gives those symbol systems power in our lives,

then even the essentially linguistic activities which comprise explanations-what in fact are "real" explanations, even important ones. They form our fundamental concepts for thinking and reasoning, and determine what significations are attributed or attached to particular events. Explanations-what are the patterns or frames for perception, the vocabularies we employ for organizing our apprehensions of our environment. While they certainly are not distinctively "historical,"[6] yet they nonetheless are explanative.

Explanations "how." More distinctively historical are explanations-how. "How did this come about?" is an ambiguous question, and hence we must identify two sub-types, once more, of explanations-how. Sometimes when I ask, "How did it come about?", I am puzzled, and do not understand how an event could possibly have occurred. Some explanations-how are what William Dray[7] has termed explanations "how-possibly," and they take the following form:

(3) "X could have occurred because a, b, and c were present in the situation."

When events puzzle us by their suddenness or unexpectedness, especially, we tend to seek explanations-how-possibly. Thus, historians have worried a good deal about the conditions in Germany which produced an Adolph Hitler and about the factors which allowed Richard Nixon's smashing victory in 1968 after he had been written off completely in 1960 and 1962. A change in the country's mood, a change in the man, shifts in party operations, innovative uses of mass media--many "possible" explanations have been offered which rationalize, i.e. make reasonable, Nixon's Phoenix-like rebirth. Explanations-how-possibly, therefore, are distinguished by their search for the conditions--a, b, and c in our sample sentence--which provide the grounds for removing puzzlement.

More often, though, when we ask "how did it come about?", we are not facing unexplainable events. We generally know how presidents are elected, how wars are waged, how orators make themselves heard by an audience. Yet, we often do not know how a specific presidential candidate got elected vis-à-vis his opponent, what operations actually triggered World War II, or why Demosthenes' Third Philippic was much more successful than his first two. These demand explanations-how-actually, not how-possibly, and can be diagrammed thusly:

(4) "X occurred because a produced b produced c produced X."

Here, we see the prototypical explanation-how: a concept (X) and data (a, b, and c) are organized into a sequence by a kind of logic. I purposely have used the ambiguous word "produced," because historians apply any number of logics in their work, only some of which are purely causal, and even fewer of which are deductive.

Some logics flow from historiographical "schools" of research. Because historiography is the concern of Professor Bormann's paper, I will not go into the subject in any detail, except to note that those schools can be thought of as operating on two levels. At a macro-level, we divide such schools, essentially, by academic discipline, and hence talk about sociological, psychological, intellectual, political, and economic approaches to historical explanation. Thus, a sociological interpretation of the American Revolution views it as a social movement; a psychological interpretation, as an alternation in a society's perceptual machinery; an intellectual interpretation, as an ideological confrontation; a political interpretation, as a process of re-institutionalization and redistribution of power; and, an economic interpretation, as a guns-and-butter issue for

England and an issue of taxation and trade policies for America.[8] Different disciplines, hence, will isolate different events and clusters-of-forces as the a's, b's, and c's which produced the X--a revolution. At a micro-level, in turn each of these approaches or schools are broken down paradigmatically. For example, among the political explanations-how we have available, some will emphasize the demographic structure-of-politics in the Namier tradition; others will follow Herbert Butterfield into an analysis of the climate-of-opinion generated by parliamentary and assembly discourse; and still others, such as Arthur Schlesinger, will examine the print media and their spread of political doctrines.[9]

Whatever, explanations-how are essentially rationalizations which, when well done, convince a reader/listener that an event in question occurred for a series of documented "reasons." If the explanation-how is carefully laid out, the historian has argued well, i.e. has produced belief in the explanation. Hence it is, I think, that explanations-how are preeminently rhetorical exercises, wherein a claim is made, evidence is marshalled, and a logic is offered to make the argument seem coherent. Explanations-how, indeed, dominate historical scholarship because it is possible to offer almost any number of potentially satisfying accounts of events; such accounts, together, form professional debates, competing voices existing in rhetorical relationships to each other.

Explanations 'why.' Buy, someone may well ask, is there not, at least in principle, a single explanation for an event, one which encompasses all of these other, seemingly partial explanations? This query is answered in the affirmative by the so-called historicist, the person who claims that historical research can produce inviolable "historical laws" which govern

the course of human conduct for all time. The historicist says that if we knew "why" events of type X occurred, we could account generally for cultural evolution and for predictions of the future as well. Such laws form the central concern of a book like Arnold Toynbee's An Outline of History, inspired as it was by Auguste d'Comte's ninteenth-century positivistic explanation of historical process [10] Adequate explanations-why can take two forms. The deductive model runs in this wise:

(5) "Covering Law Y posits that a, b, and c will produce X; a, b, and c; therefore X."

Note carefully that a so-called "covering law" is more than a logic; it is in fact a universal generalization which offers necessary connections between a series of antecedents and the event to be explained, the consequent. A problem we confront in deductive explanations-why, of course, is a very practical one: So far, no one has been satisfied with the covering laws which have been proposed as universal generalizations. Some, such as Lord Acton's "power corrupts" thesis, have been shown to have embarrassing exceptions, while others are pure tautalogies, as is the challenge/response/breakdown thesis of Toynbee.[11] One must remember, however, that just because we have not as yet discovered in fact any covering laws in no way precludes in principle their existence.

And furthermore, the deductive model of explanations-why has an alternative formulation in an inductive form. Hence, our sixth sort of historical explanation runs in this fashion:

(6) "A, b, and c produced X in situations 1, 2, and 3; therefore, a, b, and c will produce X in situation 4."

This is, in general, the outline of the work done by George Rudé in his book, The Crowd in History, 1730-1848. That book is comprised of twelve case studies of English and French riots and revolutions over a century. Rudé carefully selects his cases--some are rural, some city, some are labor while some are oligarchical, some are religious and others are secular, some are economic with others political or social. Having isolated in the cases a series of variables and having watched them work themselves out through time, he concludes the book with four chapters of generalizations concerning kinds of people who get involved, motives and beliefs which drive rioters, prototypical patterns of behavior, and factors which determine success or failure.[12] Overall, Rudé probably has produced one of the best examples available of inductive explanations-why.

Both deductive and inductive explanations-why are the work of what Newman calls "super-scientists," that is, scholars who are seeking, not mere understanding and not just rationalizations, but rather Truth with a capital T. They are investigating high-order laws of behavior which will account for past behavior and predict future occurrences. They see their work as every bit important as that done in the probablistic social sciences.[13]

Historical Explanation and Rhetorical Studies

If, then, one can posit three types of historical explanation, each with two sub-forms, the next question one must ask is this: Do we find these sorts of explanations in rhetorical literature? The answer is obvious: Yes. I shall not pretend to be able to classify any study which comes down the Quarterly Journal of Speech pipeline, but I certainly can point to illustrative examples.

I see many of the studies done in the name of "generic analysis," for example, as essentially explanations-what. Much of the current work especially in the field of apologia is of this type; these authors busy themselves defining "apologetic discourse," producing lists of sub-genres, identifying tactics peculiar to those sub-types, and then illustrating each of them, in the manner of Ware and Linkugel, and now, Kruse.[14] In a time when we have become particularly concerned with re-working our traditional categories for types of discourse, in an attempt to shake off and/or revitalize Aristotelian notions of form, it should come as no surprise that explanations-what abound in the field of generic analysis.

For explanations-how, there perhaps is no better place to turn than to our work on political campaigns. As we have come to realize that campaigns, after all, are complex communicative processes involving the interaction of almost innumerable discourses, media, perceptual adjustments, and miscellaneous happenings seen as politically significant, we search time and again for satisfactory explanations of how it was that Kennedy won, that Nixon could be re-born, that Carter could come from nowhere. Our explanations of the electoral process multiply with almost every new issue of a journal--Fisher's "dream" analysis, Bormann's fantasy theme scheme, Anderson's "characterization" model, Simons' social movement perspective, Harrell, Ware, and Linkugel's apologetic model, the dramaturgical metaphor adopted by the Campaign '76 Task Force, etc.[15] Just as historians generally are extremely fond of explanations-how, so too, with rhetorical analysts.

And finally, especially in our literature on social movements can we discover several noteworthy attempts at providing explanations-why for mass rhetorical behavior. On a relatively small scale, for example,

Theodore Windt offers a theory of last resort to explain the prominence of the diatribe in both the Second Sophistic and the 1960's, and Ralph R. Smith and Russel R. Windes propose a theory of mobilization to account for organization; Dan F. Hahn and Ruth M. Gonchar offer essentially a neo-Aristotelian approach to the "shared belief" phenomenon they see as the quintenscence of social movements; Smith and Windes opt for a theory of innovation to account for movements not dealt with adequately under traditional conflict models; and, Leland M. Griffin has developed a dramatistic theory of human behavior to explain the recurrence of selected rhetorical phenomena.[16] While each of these attempt to root rhetorical discoursing in covering laws has weaknesses, at least we can say that these scholars are trying to isolate historical laws--often with support from the probablistic social sciences--to explain and predict generally characteristics of discourse.

Concluding Observations

As I conclude these observations and formulations, a few remarks relative to this convention's theme are in order. In 1977 we are concerned with finding "centers that hold." Given the inclinations of our founders and earliest scholars, it is only expected that historical studies of rhetorical artifacts and processes should comprise an important center for this discipline. We have been charged, however, in another panel at this convention, with destroying that core. Professors Gerald Mohrmann and Michael Leff view rhetorical studies' dalliance with non-rhetorical concepts and idiosyncratic methods-for-analysis as a sign that our high ground is disintegrating.

I disagree. The field's work with concepts such as those I have mentioned today is an indication that we, like our brethren in other historically-based fields, are searching for a set of concepts which reflects contemporary interests and understandings. The old adage has it that every period must re-define history for itself, and we are no exceptions. We must offer anew explanations-what in a vocabulary which reflects our Third Century's vision of mental, social, political, economic, and, yes, rhetorical processes.

The same can be said for our explanations-how. We have come to realize that great speeches do not, by themselves, produce changes in votes and behavior. Hence, we have been actively buying into various schools of historical and social process so as to, in a more sophisticated way than heretofore, explain broad ranges of rhetorical effects. Such appeals as those to Namierite structural analysis, the concept of "polarization," the process of "mystification," and others we find in our journals, to my mind, do not represent the abandonment of core concerns. Rather, they are attempts to re-cast our explanations-how in perspectives, data, and logics attractive enough to produce requisite belief in consumers of history. The fact that Mohrmann and Leff themselves have worked through alternative perspectives and logics so as to discover an adequate explanation-how for Lincoln's Cooper Union address is certainly an indication that they are sensitive to the value of such disputes as are produced by varied schools-of-interpretation.[17]

And finally, I think, we must applaud the attempt by rhetorical historians to seek out broad explanations-why. Better, even, than most of our colleagues in "real" history departments, we have been making the effort.

Even if the covering laws we currently employ seem inadequate, even if most of us still are more interested in explaining particulars rather than enduring generalizations, and even if few of us have had the devotion necessary to study many like-situations rather than a single one, the fact remains that our theorizing is producing some exciting results; I recommend particularly the corpus of scholarship currently being built around Professor Bormann's approach to fantasy themes.[18] Our colleagues in other fields often fear that explanations-why will lead to a notion of historical determinism, which has been a traditional devil-concept in western research; rhetorical scholars, however, appear not to hold that fear, and hence have not eschewed bald theorizing. Such work on historical laws or generalizations does not destroy our core, but on the contrary may harden it by providing models we can employ to organize myriad studies of similar discourse-events.

In sum, I believe that historical investigation can and ought to continue to provide speech communication with a "center that holds." I am arguing implicitly for increased sensitivity to the nature of the historian's claims and to the rationales which justify the enterprise. I hold firm to Henri Marrou's admonishment to professional history writers:

> The [historical] scholar who makes use of a method when he knows nothing of its logical structure, or who applies rules without knowing how to gauge their efficacy, becomes like a worker who has charge of a factory machine, controlling its operation but quite incapable of making repairs--and even less able to construct it. We must sternly repudiate any such attitude of mind because it constitutes one of the gravest dangers threatening the future of our Western

civilization, already on the verge of foundering in an atrocious technological barbarism.[19]

Students of rhetorical history would do well to engage in continued examinations of their logical structures.

Notes

[1]I am thinking of such pieces as: J. A. Hendrix, "In Defense of Neo-Aristotelian Rhetorical Criticism," Western Speech, 32 (Fall 1968), 246-52; Lloyd Bitzer, "The Rhetorical Situation," Philosophy & Rhetoric, 1 (Winter 1968), 1-14; John W. Pathbun, "The Problem of Judgment and Effect in Historical Criticism: A Proposed Solution," Western Speech, 33 (Summer 1969), 146-59; Joe A. Munshaw, "The Structures of History: Dividing Phenomena for Rhetorical Understanding," Central States Speech Journal, 24 (Spring 1973), 29-42; Michael C. McGee, "The Fall of Wellington: A Case Study of the Relationship Between Theory, Practice and Rhetoric in History," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 63 (February 1977), 28-42; and Barnet Baskerville, "Must We all be Rhetorical Critics?", Quarterly Journal of Speech, 63 (April 1977), 107-116. We also, of course, are beginning to explicitly treat the scholarship of historians rhetorically, as witness Ronald H. Carpenter, "Frederick Jackson Turner and the Rhetorical Impact of the Frontier Thesis," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 63 (April 1977), 117-129.

[2]Bruce E. Gronbeck, "Rhetorical History and Rhetorical Criticism: A Distinction," Speech Teacher 24 (November 1975), 309-320. The position is partially critiqued by Baskerville (n. 1).

[3]To my knowledge, only William Dray has discussed all three questions, and even he has not explicitly offered comparisions across all three. (See William Dray, "Explaining Why and Explaining How," Laws and Explanations in History [1957; rpt. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1964], pp. 156-172; and "'Explaining What' in History," Theories of History, ed. Patrick Gardiner [1959; rpt. Glencoe: The Free Press, 1963], pp. 403-408.) Explanations-

how and -why, however, have been a concern among philosophers of science and history for some time, at least since the appearance of C. G. Hempel and Paul Oppenheim's "Studies in the Logic of Explanation," Philosophy of Science, 15 (1948), 135-75; there then followed a flurry of articles and anthologies worrying about (a) the "scientific" bases of historical explanation, (b) the "objectivity" of the historical enterprise, and (c) the "uniqueness"--especially vis-à-vis social-scientific research--of historical truths. (That list is too long to reproduce here, although most items can be found in the footnotes to William Dray, ed., Philosophical Analysis and History [New York: Harper & Row, 1966], and to Fred D. Newman, Explanation By Description; An Essay on Historical Methodology [The Hauge: Mouton, 1968].) As I proceed, I will note some of the ways in which my formulations differ significantly from those of others who have participated in these debates.

[4]John R. Searle, Speech Acts; An Essay in the Philosophy of Language (Cambridge: At the Univ. Press, 1969), esp. pp. 33-42. For an example, see my "Rhetorical Timing in Public Communication," Central States Speech Journal, 25 (Summer 1974), 84-94.

[5]See Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality; A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge (1966; rpt. Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1967), esp. Chaps. II and III, and several of the readings (especially those by Alfred Schutz) in Mary Douglas, ed., Rules and Meanings; The Anthropology of Everyday Knowledge (Middlesex, Eng.: Penguin Education, 1973).

[6]Dray ('Explaining What,' p. 406) formulates this sort of explanation thusly; "X, y and z amount to a Q." I find that statement ambiguous because

it does not separate cases wherein a concept is operationalized (as in my first form) from those wherein it is more strictly explaining what went on (as in my second form). The fact that other participants in the debate over historical explanation generally have ignored the essay may well indicate the importance of this deficiency. For an attack upon the "uniqueness" question, see May Brodbeck, "Explanation, Prediction, and 'Imperfect Knowledge,'" Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 3 (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minn. Press, 1963).

[7]Dray advanced the notion of "how-possibly" explanations in "Explaining Why and Explaining How" (n. 3). It is critiqued admirably in Newman, Chaps., III and IV, and in Alan Donagan, "The Popper-Hempel Theory Reconsidered," Philosophical Analysis and History, ed. Dray, pp. 127-59. Dray verbally constructs his prototypical illustration as follows: "How could that have happened, in the light of so-and-so?" (p. 168). I simply have changed that formulation from a question to a statement.

[8]Jack P. Greene has collected both metahistorical essays and pieces of historical scholarship illustrating these perspectives. See his two edited volumes, The Ambiguity of the American Revolution (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), for the theoretical debate, and The Reinterpretation of the American Revolution; 1763-1789 (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), for the case studies.

For a fuller discussion and illustration of explanations-how-actually, see Newman, Chap. IV. And, for a more particularized form of these explanations--one which attempts to "rationalize" the evolving process which carries us from "a" to the "X" in question, see W. B. Gallie, "Explanations in History and the Genetic Sciences," Mind, 64 (1966), 160-80. Finally, we should note that this sort of explanation--mistakenly, I think--sometimes

is termed an "explanation-why," as it is by Scriven, who characterizes it thusly: "An explanation tells us why something occurred if it tells us what factor or factors of the type in which we are interested (e.g. economical, motivational, political) actually brought it about, i.e., what factor, in the circumstances, so tipped the balance of events as to produce the known outcome" (Michael Scriven, "Causes, Connections and Conditions in History," Philosophical Analysis and History, ed. Dray, p. 248). Dray himself seems to call it an explanation "why-necessarily" ("Explaining Why and Explaining How," p. 161), which only confuses the issue. I prefer to save the word "why" for the sorts of explanations we next will encounter.

[9]Sir Lewis Namier, The Structure of Politics at the Assession of George III, 2nd ed. (1957; rpt. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1961); Herbert Butterfield, George III, Lord North and the People 1779-1780 (London: G. Bell, 1949); Arthur M. Schlesinger, Prelude to Independence; The Newspaper War on Britain 1764-1776 (New York: Vintage Books, 1957). A large variety of historiographical positions in the British tradition is reviewed in J. R. Hale, ed., The Evolution of British Historiography From Bacon to Namier (New York: The World Pub. Co., 1964).

[10]For discussions of Toynbee, see Gustav Bergmann, Philosophy of Science (Madison: Univ. of Wisc. Press, 1968), esp. pp. 124-30.

[11]These and other candidates for covering laws are discussed in Donagan, pp. 142-46, and in Henri-Irenée Marrou, The Meaning of History (Baltimore: Helicon, 1966), Chap. VII, "Explanation and Its Limitations." For a sweeping attempt to discover fundamental biological-social laws governing all of historical evolution, see Charles Morazé, The Logic of History, trans. and annot. Wilson W. Clough (The Hague: Mouton, 1976).

The demands of a "covering law"--what Hempel calls the "deductive-nomological explanation"--are rigid; Hempel, for one, however, will allow an historian to use the deductive model in an "ellipical" or "partial" form. Such forms he terms "explanation sketches." See Hempel, pp. 103-107.

[12]George Rudé, The Crowd in History, 1730-1848 (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1964).

[13]Newman, Chap. VI.

[14]B. L. Ware and Wil A. Linkugel, "They Spoke in Defense of Themselves: On the General Criticism of Apologia," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 59 (October 1973), 273-83; Noreen W. Kruse, "Motivational Factors in Non-Denial Apologia," Central States Speech Journal, 28 (Spring 1977), 13-23. Other generic studies following explanation-what formats include: Howard H. Martin, "The Fourth of July Oration," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 44 (December 1958), 393-401; Lawrence W. Rosenfield, "A Case Study in Speech Criticism: The Truman-Nixon Analog," Speech Monographs, 35 (November 1968), 435-450; Bower Aly, "The Gallows Speech: A Lost Genre," Southern Speech Journal, 34 (Spring 1969), 204-212; Richard B. Gregg and Gerard A. Hauser, "Richard Nixon's April 30, 1970 Address on Cambodia: The 'Ceremony' of Coronation," Speech Monographs, 40 (August 1973), 167-181; and several essays in the forthcoming book on 'significant form' and rhetorical criticism, ed. Karlyn K. Campbell and Kathleen M. Jamieson (in press as of this writing).

A reading of Ware and Linkugel vis-à-vis Kruse, in terms of their competing explanations-what, is instructive. Ware and Linkugel define an "apologetic discourse" as one which relies upon one of four methods of resolution; they thus isolate their sub-genres--absolutive, vindictive, ex-

planative, and justificatory--in terms of audiences' psychological states. Kruse, on the other hand, defines an "apologetic discourse" as one which plays out certain rhetor motives; thus she isolates another set of sub-genres--survival responses, social responses, and self-actualized responses--in terms of speaker's psychological states. Both Ware and Linkugel and Kruse have "explained" what an apologetic discourse is; they simply have concentrated upon differing sets of defining characteristics. Neither is "right" or "wrong," because both can account for the actual events--a body of speeches. They, simply, have offered more or less conceptually useful explanations.

[15]Walter R. Fisher, "Reaffirmation and Subversion of the American Dream," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 59 (April 1973), 160-67; Ernest G. Bormann, "The Eagleton Affair: A Fantasy Theme Analysis," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 59 (April 1973), 143-59; Robert O. Anderson, "The Characterization Model for Rhetorical Criticism of Political Image Campaigns," Western Speech, 37 (Spring 1973), 75-86; Herbert W. Simons et al., "A Movement Perspective on the 1972 Presidential Campaign," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 59 (April 1973), 168-79; Jackson Harrell, B. L. Ware, and Wil A. Linkugel, "Failure of Apology in American Politics: Nixon on Watergate," Speech Monographs, 42 (November 1975), 245-61; Bruce E. Gronbeck, ed., Presidential Campaign Rhetoric: The Drama of Primary and Electoral Politics (in press as of this writing).

Generally, explanations-how dominate our so-called "effects" analyses. See, for example, Andrew A. King and Floyd D. Anderson, "Nixon, Agnew, and the 'Silent Majority': A Case Study in the Rhetoric of Polarization," Western Speech, 35 (Fall 1971), 243-55; Robert W. Norton, "The Rhetorical

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[17]Michael C. Leff and G. P. Mohrmann, "Lincoln at Cooper Union: A Rhetorical Analysis of the Text," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 60 (October

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[18]See Ernest G. Bormann, "Fantasy and Rhetorical Vision: The Rhetorical Criticism of Social Reality," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 58 (December 1972), 396-407. Professor Bormann has available a list of twelve articles, nine doctoral dissertations, and two Master's theses which have flowed from his work. (Department of Speech-Communication, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN., 55655).

[19]Marrou, p. 11.